Intelligence Reports

October 17, 1967: This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966 through June 1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba over Che Guevara's mission to Bolivia. The cable provides specific information on Leonid Brezhnev's objections to "the dispatch of Ernesto Che Guevara to Bolivia" and Brezhnev's decision to send the Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's visit to Cuba in June, 1967 to discuss the Kremlin's opposition with Castro. CIA sources reported that Kosygin accused Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be 'socialist' or communist, were engaged in disputes with the 'legitimate' Latin American communist parties...favored by the USSR." In replying Castro stated that Cuba would support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." Castro also "accused the USSR of having turned its back upon its own revolutionary tradition and of having moved to a point where it would refuse to support any revolutionary movement unless the actions of the latter contributed to the achievement of Soviet objectives...."

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SANITIZED

17 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY:             CUBA/USSR

DO:                         SEPTEMBER 1966 ? JUNE 1967

SUBJECT:              1. BACKGROUND OF SOVIET PREMIER ALEKSEY KOSYGIN?S VISIT  TO HAVANA

                                2. CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KOSYGIN AND CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO

ACQ                        OCTOBER 1967

SOURCE                 [MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS]

(SUMMARY: [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] IN LATE 1966 [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] BREZHNEV STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE DISPATCH OF ERNESTO ?CHE? GUEVARA TO BOLIVIA AND CASTRO?S POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DURING KOSYGIN?S VISIT CASTRO EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF HIS REVOLUTIONARY POLICY. CUBA EVALUATED THE KOSYGIN VISIT AS PRODUCTIVE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT DIVERGENT VIEWS CONTINUED TO EXIST REGARDING REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. END SUMMARY)

1.       [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] IN THE FALL OF 1966 CASTRO [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] INFORMED BREZHNEV THAT ERNESTO ?CHE? GUEVARA, WITH MEN AND MATERIAL FURNISHED BY CUBA, HAD GONE TO BOLIVIA TO MOUNT A REVOLUTION WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] IN JUNE 1967, BREZHNEV, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT GUEVARA, [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] REPLIED THAT HE (GUEVARA) WAS THERE IN LATIN AMERICA ?MAKING HIS REVOLUTIONS.? [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE FAILURE OF CASTRO TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ADVANCE NOTICE CONCERNING THE DISPATCH OF GUEVARA, AND IN STRONG TERMS CRITICIZED THE DECISION OF CASTRO TO UNDERTAKE GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA OR OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. BREZHNEV STATED THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES WERE HARMFUL TO THE TRUE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNIST CAUSE AND INQUIRED AS TO ?WHAT RIGHT? CASTRO HAD TO FOMENT REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA WITHOUT APPROPRIATE COORDINATION WITH THE OTHER ?SOCIALIST? COUNTRIES.

2.             [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] IT APPEARS THAT CASTRO WAS IRRITATED AT [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] BREZHNEV  [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] THE SOVIETS DECIDED THAT A VISIT TO CUBA BY ONE OF THE SOVIET LEADERS WAS ADVISABLE. PLANS FOR THE VISIT HAD BEEN COMPLETED BEFORE THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS ERUPTED IN THE SPRING OF 1967. SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN IT WAS DECIDED THAT PREMIER KOSYGIN WOULD VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO ADDRESS THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, IT WAS AGREED THAT KOSYGIN WOULD RETURN TO MOSCOW VIA HAVANA.

3.             THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF KOSYGIN?S TRIP TO HAVANA 26 ? 30 JUNE 1967 WAS TO INFORM CASTRO CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, NOTABLY TO EXPLAIN SOVIET POLICY REGARDING THE CRISIS. A SECONDARY BUT IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE TRIP WAS TO DISCUSS WITH CASTRO THE SUBJECT OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA.[PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] KOSYGIN REPEATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT CASTRO WAS HARMING THE COMMUNIST CAUSE THROUGH HIS SPONSORSHIP OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THROUGH PROVIDING SUPPORT TO VARIOUS ANTI-GOVERNMENT TROUPS, WHICH ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIMED TO BE ?SOCIALIST? OR COMMUNIST, WERE ENGAGED IN DISPUTES WITH THE ?LEGITIMATE? LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES I.E., THOSE FAVORED BY THE USSR. KOSYGIN SAID THAT THE INTERNECINE STRUGGLES AMONG THE VARIOUS LEFT REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS WERE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE IMPERIALISTS AND WERE WEAKENING AND DIVERTING THE EFFORTS OF THE ?SOCIALIST WORLD? TO ?LIBERATE? LATIN AMERICA.

4.             IN REPLYING TO KOSYGIN CASTRO [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] STATED THAT ?CHE? GUEVARA HAD GONE TO BOLIVIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAME ?RIGHT? AS THAT UNDER WHICH GUEVARA HAD COME TO CUBA TO AID CASTRO IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST BATISTA; THE ?RIGHT? OF EVERY LATIN AMERICA TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LIBERATION OF HIS COUNTRY AND THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN LATIN AMERICA, AND WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE FEATS OF THE LEADING LATIN AMERICAN ?LIBERATORS,? NOTABLY BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN.

5.             CASTRO ADDED THAT CUBA DID NOT AGREE WITH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ?WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION? IN LATIN AMERICA. HE ACCUSED THE USSR OF HAVING TURNED ITS BACK UPON ITS OWN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION AND OF HAVING MOVED TO A POINT WHERE IT WOULD REFUSE TO SUPPORT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT UNLESS THE ACTIONS OF THE LATTER CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. CASTRO SAID THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT HONORED THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF TRU COMMUNISM, I.E., THE LIBERATION OF MANKIND THROUGOUT THE WORLD. CASTRO CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT REGARDLESS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA WOULD SUPPORT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHICH IT CONSIDERED WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

6.             DESPITE THE OPEN DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, THE DISCUSSIONS WITH KOSYGIN CONCERNING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO CUBA WERE HELD IN AN AMICABLE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY CUBA WITH CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AID AND THAT THE MILITARY AID PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, WOULD BE CONTINUED.

7.             AFTER KOSYGIN?S DEPARTURE THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP ASSESSED THE VISIT AS HAVING BEEN A USEFUL ONE. THE CUBAN LEADERS JUDGED THAT THEY HAD CLEARLY EXPLAINED THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SEIROUS DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE CUBANS WERE ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO SEE THAT ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENT EXISTED IN THE POLITICAL SECTOR, RELATIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SECTORS HAD REMAINED ON A FRIENDLY AND PRODUCTIVE BASIS.

8.             [PART OF TEXT MARKED OUT FOR SECURITY REASONS] DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT.

(ADVANCED COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE, NSA, WHITE HOUSE,

DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, NIC, OCI)